PERCEPTIONS OF LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER:
A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF COLLECTIVE
LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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ABSTRACT

The paper introduces the concept of collective legal consciousness, understood as the dominant perception of what law is and how people tend to relate to it in a given society. The author takes a constructivist approach in order to explore the way in which people in the society develop a distinct interpretation of how social order is organized, what role law plays in maintaining that order, and how it becomes embedded in everyday life. She contends that although collective legal consciousness at a societal level appears to be too complex to be subjected to analytical modeling, it is nevertheless possible to identify some of its dimensions. She further argues that each society develops over time a specific combination of those dimensions. The author uses empirical data from four countries, Bulgaria, England, Poland, and Norway, in order to show the way in which collective legal consciousness varies from one society to another.

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INTRODUCTION

Socio-legal scholars generally agree that law is made by the society around it, and that it necessarily reflects the complexity of social relationships. Although some scholars tend to disagree about how closely law “mirrors” society, many would dispute that law is a product of social

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† For a review of the debate, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAH, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (2001); ALAN WATSON, THE NATURE OF LAW (1977); David Nelken, Towards a
interaction; in the contemporary jargon, it is “socially constructed.” But, what are the implications of that understanding for our description of what law is in any particular society? If we are to be consistent in our acceptance of the proposition that law has a constructed nature, then we must also bear in mind that to some extent every society is unique. The distinctive characteristics of the local configuration of values, traditions, and established institutional arrangements will produce changes in the meanings and roles attached to law as we move from examining one society to another. The nature of law as a social phenomenon must therefore depend in part on the specific characteristics of the particular social fabric in which it is embedded. Being an organic part of that fabric, it will be closely intertwined with other socially constructed concepts that also play a significant role in that society such as power, citizenship, and trust.

This paper is an attempt to take a step forward in the analysis of this phenomenon, from the abstract statement that law is contextualized to the concrete examination of what that statement means in practical, everyday terms. The method selected is comparison: The distinct interpretations of law and meanings attributed to law in different societies will be set side by side to distinguish the similarities from the contrasts. Empirical data derived from comparative analysis will be used to identify what is unique about the way in which people construct concepts of law in their own social setting.

I. METHODOLOGY

The data that I will be using to support my conclusions have been collected by a combination of focus group discussions and representative surveys conducted in England, Poland, Bulgaria, and Norway. In each country, eight groups were established in different towns, with the members of each selected with care so as to include people from different backgrounds. The questions discussed in the focus groups were designed to draw out the person’s perceptions of law, for

Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 7 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001); OSCAR CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005).

Data was collected as a part of a broader project: Marina Kurkchiyan et al., Legal Cultures in Transition – The Impact of European Integration (Research Council of Nor., 2007–current) (on file with author). The research design and the data collection methodology were produced collaboratively by four research partners from Bergen, Glasgow, Oslo and Oxford. However, the author of this paper is solely responsible for the arguments presented here.

See apps. infra pp. 31–33.
instance: What images and thoughts come to mind when we mention law? Is law important in daily life and if so, why and when? Should judges have discretion when they reach a judgment on a case, or not? What should be taken into consideration when a law is being drafted: moral values, customs, usefulness, or some other consideration? Should all laws be obeyed at all times regardless of the change in circumstances from one situation to another? Are there occasions when it is justifiable to disobey the law? In addition, we included a series of questions about the images that people have of lawyers, judges, and politicians.

For my analysis, the questions themselves are not important provided that the same issues are explored in all the groups and provided also that the discussion is continuously focused on the issue of law. I read through the transcripts to tease out what was said on each particular theme throughout the entire discussion and identified patterns in the responses and comments of the participants.

The second stage of the data collection was opinion surveying.\textsuperscript{4} I will be referring to the findings that emerged from representative surveys of one thousand people in each country. I use this data to support and illustrate the qualitative analysis that is derived primarily from the transcripts of the focus group discussions.

However, the records of the Norwegian focus group discussions have not been translated into English and therefore have not been available to me. For that reason, my account will be based on only three countries: England, Poland, and Bulgaria. To build my arguments, I first identified a pattern by analysing the focus group transcripts from those three countries. Then, I checked to see whether evidence from the opinion surveys in those three countries supported my inferences. At this stage, an examination of the survey data from Norway was helpful in suggesting ways to think about possible explanations of the findings, and that helped to ground the discussion. Therefore, each reference to Norwegian legal consciousness should be treated as an extrapolation of inferences drawn from qualitative data about England, Poland, and Bulgaria, which has then been applied to the survey data from Norway.

Before moving to the main body of the paper, I would like also to point out what I will not be claiming in the paper in order to avoid any unnecessary misinterpretation.

\textsuperscript{4} Surveys were conducted in England (Jan.–Feb. 2009), Bulgaria (Feb. 2009), Poland (Feb.–Mar. 2009), and Norway (May–July 2009) (on file with author).
First, my stress on differences neither means that I am suggesting that the countries are completely different from each other nor, that law has no universal properties; the opposite is true. The resemblances between countries are so pronounced that it is often difficult to spot the particular differences between them. Also, the picture is never uniformly black and white: We observed a variety of views in all countries, some of which were similar or even identical to those expressed elsewhere. In this paper, I will be reporting mainly on the mainstream views, together with significantly stronger tendencies where they occurred in any particular country. The emphasis will be on differences, rather than attempting to give a balanced account with all the similarities included.

Second, I will not be referring to actual behaviour. I have based my conclusions on subjective accounts. This paper presents perceptions and interpretations of what people have told us they understand about the world around them, what they believe, what they want, and what they say they usually do. I have not used data that would enable me to judge how people actually behave. I will not be using statistics on recorded crime or corruption. If a member of a discussion group exclaims that “everyone disobeys the law,” that does not provide usable data about how often that person or anyone else actually disobeys the law in that society. It does, however, reveal something about their social expectations, their perception of legality in the society around them, and the character of their social relationships.

II. THE SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED NATURE OF LAW AND ORDER

At the theoretical level, the questions of how social order is maintained and of the role that law plays in organizing it have been extensively debated since the early days of sociology. For those who favour a systems approach, social order is imposed from above, be it through moral and normative imperatives as Emile Durkheim suggested, by suppressive force exerted by the governing elite as Marxists would argue, or possibly by systems of communication and creation of “zones of reduced complexity” as Niklas Luhmann believed.

Others have adopted a “bottom up” approach, where social order at the societal level is the outcome of particular social interactions at the face-to-face level. The sources of social order were thought to begin with egoistic interests or whatever the other motives are that drive the everyday activities of ordinary people. They are then reinforced by their interpretations of the social environment that surrounds them.\(^8\)

Depending on the wide choice of lenses that social scientists offer for looking at social reality, one can view social order in a variety of different ways. For example, one can view social order as a set of established practices,\(^9\) as cohesive interactions and chains of ongoing conflicts,\(^10\) or as a harmonious process of co-operation, co-ordination, and integration.\(^11\)

The vision of how society establishes and maintains social order determines the way that one interprets the nature and role of law within that order. For instance, in the Durkheimian world, law belongs to the normative system that facilitates co-operation and makes it possible for complex societies to exist in a state of solidarity.\(^12\) On the other hand, one can interpret law as a method of legitimizing the power of the state, by those convinced by the Weberian presentation of social order.\(^13\) In the alternative, one can interpret law as an instrument of subjugation by means of an imposed ideology, as Marxists would point out.\(^14\)

But how do people experience and interpret the social order that they are part of and, by doing so, continuously construct and sustain it? How do people see the role and importance of law in maintaining order in their daily life? Can one identify a dominant perception of law in a society? If so, then there must be a phenomenon within that society that one can describe as “collective legal consciousness.” If there is, should one expect to find that it differs from one society to another?

Until recently, studies of “legal consciousness” have been directed at the concept, as it exists in the mind of an individual person.

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\(^9\) See Rob Stones, Structuration Theory (2005).


Inspired by the constructivist vision of law, a number of socio-legal scholars have attempted to map the variety of specific ways in which people relate to law in their daily lives. Their research has produced a stream of empirical studies describing what people think about the law, how they use it, and the effect of the complete set of ideas that people have about law on their decisions and actions in everyday life.

In a trend-setting study of the perception of law by lower-class Americans, Sally Engle Merry framed her observations in terms of “legal ideology.” She identified two sub-forms of that ideology: one that pictures a formally defined and state-wide set of rules and rights; the other, an informal and situational one that emerges from a pragmatic assessment of one’s personal interests in an actual situation. In this model of legal consciousness, the two sub-forms of legal ideology interact in the mind; everyone moves from one to the other with ease. According to Merry’s observation, the use of the informal version of the ideology in legal practice often helps to convey the meaning of the formal ideology to ordinary people so that it makes sense in daily life.

Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey have put forward a different classification of forms of legal consciousness. Like Sally Merry, they drew their ideas from a study of ordinary citizens. They studied people who live and work in New Jersey in order to assemble the findings described in The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life. After analysing the various encounters with the law described to them, they suggested a model that classified people’s approaches to legality into three groups. An image that they termed “before the law” captures a perception of law as an authoritative and formal domain, remote from anyone’s interests and emotions. A second image, “with the law,” views law as a strategic game, an arena in which people could both pursue their interests and also try to alter the rules in their favour as they go along. The third variety of the relationship with law resulted from connecting legality with power and coercion, so that actions performed in the name of the law were seen as being arbitrary.

In The Ethnography of Legal Discourse, Conley and O’Barr also put forward ideas about the nature of legal consciousness. Like the other aforementioned research, they were empirical in their method, drawing upon real world data rather than mere speculation or logical inference.

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15 Sally Engle Merry, Concepts of Law and Justice Among Working-Class Americans, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 59, 60 (1985).
Working in an anthropological mode that came close to Merry’s observations, they identified and documented ways in which social actors think about law and relate to it. To them, two styles of thought about law appeared to predominate. They defined one of them as “relationship oriented” and the other as “rule oriented.”

A series of more specific studies of legal consciousness followed and built a general consensus around the broad conclusion that the way in which people perceive law and legality is a multilayered and dynamic construct, responsive to their surrounding social situation. If that is so, then the question can be asked whether it is reasonable to expect that the specific features of the social environment in any given society will cause some aspects of people’s legal consciousness to be more strongly expressed than they would be in another society. Put another way, the distinctive features of any one society would cause it to form its own distinctive pattern of collective legal consciousness.

Although socio-legal scholars have yet to use widely the term “collective legal consciousness,” several discourses have floated the idea. For example, Denis Galligan has pointed out the reflective nature of the norms, cognitive formations, and established practices within the overlapping “social spheres” that form societies. And in the wider debate on comparative legal cultures there is an explicit acknowledgement that a society can itself generate social forces that determine how people think and act in relation to law. However, such broad concepts tend not to distinguish clearly between the normative, cognitive, and behavioural elements and are therefore difficult to test empirically. As a result, the promising idea of “collective legal consciousness” tends to be lost in the complexity of the overarching layers.

In this paper, I will attempt an empirical study of collective legal consciousness at a societal level. I will consider whether it is possible to identify a pattern of thinking among people about what law is, and how

19 D.J. Galligan, Law in Modern Society 103–17 (2007).
they relate to it in response to legal traditions, current institutional arrangements, and the social relationships in the society. Although I will not aim at placing my conclusions on collective legal consciousness in a broader context in this paper, I suggest that the findings presented here hold out the prospect of doing so. Either they could serve as a foundation for more in-depth and systematic research into legal cultures, or they might enhance our understanding of how to approach research into social spheres in general by using social groups and institutions as units of analysis.

III. COLLECTIVE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS ANALYZED EMPIRICALLY

The pivotal narratives from the focus group discussion of England, Poland, and Bulgaria presents the accounts of how people see social order and what they think that the role of law is in everyday life. In each focus group, everyone agreed that it is impossible to have order unless there is law. In all the countries, everyone believed that “if there was no law, there would be . . .” and then they would use one of the usual negative words such as chaos or anarchy. Law is there to protect people against crime and help to resolve conflicts. Most people used some version of an assumption put forward in one of the English groups: “It does teach a code of conduct. I mean, why don’t we go out, all of us, and steal and murder and rape and pillage? Those days are gone, when the Vikings came over.”[E 4]. 21 That sentiment could come from any group in any place.

However, differences between the countries became apparent after a closer look at how the vision of social order is constructed and what role that vision allocates to law in securing the order.

In the English discussions, the theme of social order was formulated either in terms of freedom and the boundaries required to contain that freedom or in terms of a negotiation between right and wrong. For instance: “You have got to have some parameters in everything you do. So yes: you need freedom but you cannot just have total freedom, because people bounce off walls; they need walls to bounce off. So law is the wall to bounce off.” [E 1]. Or consider another quote, which expresses the general tone of the English FG discussions: “Otherwise it is chaos. Everybody has different ideas of what’s right and

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21 Here and throughout, quotations will be identified by the country where the focus group discussion took place (E for England, B for Bulgaria, and P for Poland) and by a number that corresponds to the list of focus groups in the appendix.
what’s wrong. It would not work. You have to compromise what you believe in so that you can get along in your life.” [E 4].

In other words, in the English worldview, law and the processes related to law, such as lawmaking and enforcing law, were mostly seen as a means of negotiation to find a compromise between conflicting interpretations of right and wrong. This approach then develops into the concerns about over-regulation that are familiar to everyone in Britain, with its characteristic talk about a “nanny state”22 and about how much freedom one should give up for the sake of social order and comfort. “I think there are too many laws, a nanny-state comes to mind. We have a lot more laws now than ten years ago. I think they are trying to take away more freedom from you now.” [E 4]. “[There are] powers that are telling us what to do all the time” [E 5], and they are “watching what you are doing, every single little thing.” [E 1]. “Sometimes there is just so much that you think that you are not free.” [E 1].

Those statements were illustrated by examples, usually drawn from health and safety regulations in the workplace or traffic surveillance and speed limits but occasionally from more technically specific regimes such as regulation of agricultural food production or land contamination. [E 5].

Within the framework of English legal consciousness, the association between the nanny state and overregulation was contrasted to the association between law and common sense. The expectation that law should always be grounded on common sense, and that it is, in most situations, was strongly expressed throughout. Even more, our respondents often believed that common sense should take priority over law. For instance, judges should have the appropriate discretion to use common sense when they decide cases. Sentiments such as this were typical: “You need an infrastructure but I think that there has to be common sense there as well” [E 1], or “the letter of the law is the letter of the law but people are people as well . . . you can provide the law, but it has got to be relevant to each circumstance and it must have common sense.” [E 2].

Furthermore, English judges were criticized for not using common sense as much as they should. Focus group members were generally pleased that the country has juries in criminal trials. They thought that juries could be relied upon to apply common sense because

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22 The term “nanny state” is widely used in Britain when people criticize official interference in everyday life on the ground that it is over-protective or intrudes into the private sphere.
they were composed of ordinary citizens, as opposed to judges who only knew the law and did not know real life. For example, “I think that the law helps people until you get to court, and it all goes wrong there because the judges are way out of touch, they don’t know what’s going on in the world, and they’re handing out these stupid sentences.” [E 3].

Respondents expected that everyone who deals with law should exercise common sense: when laws are introduced, when they are enforced, and when they are adjudicated. Some stories told by the participants support this argument. For instance, a woman from Bristol told the group how her husband got involved in a fight with a group of youngsters who were tormenting an old man. [F 3]. One of them persisted in being aggressive, so her husband “went ‘pow’ and knocked this guy out flat unconscious, and then someone called the police and it was [her] husband that was nearly arrested. . . . And the police were very good. They actually said to my husband ‘I think you should disappear and we will pretend we have not seen you.’” [E 3]. The reaction of the group to the story was one of unqualified approval of the police action, typified by the remark that “the police took a common sense approach.” [E 3].

In terms of what law means in everyday life, the general assumption was that the law was there to help them by providing guidelines that they should take into account. As one participant put it, “The definition of law is the guidance of wise men and the obedience of fools.” [E 5]. In that sense, the English version of legal consciousness comes close to the socio-legal concept of “soft law,” law that provides policy guidance and is concerned with the outcome rather than a set of precise rules to follow strictly.

In Bulgaria, the contrast with England was stark. Rules, obligations, and prescriptions were all seen as obligatory. Law and order were associated mostly with discipline and compliance. Law in the Bulgarian context was presented as a set of rigid rules that could not be disregarded. The phrases used by representative focus group members drew the picture in sharp outline: “Law is an iron rule that must be respected; there are no excuses” [B 5]; “it is a path drawn by the legislator and everyone must walk along it” [B 2]; “[t]he law is not about protection, it is an obligation.” [B 1]. In one case we were told that “What comes to my mind is a shelf full of thick volumes. I try to think of it as a protection of people’s rights, but that does not work. There is no image of law like that in my mind.” [B 4].
The Bulgarian approach was highly formalistic. There, law is strictly a matter of expert knowledge and not of common sense. Lay people assume that they do not possess that knowledge and therefore should not have any say in the court at all. Because it is a matter of highly specialized knowledge, “Law creates problems for ordinary people because they cannot interpret law and make use of it by themselves.” [B 2]. “You need someone to explain the hidden meaning [of law] to you and only then can you start looking for options.” [B 3]. And politicians, just like any other layperson, are incapable of drafting good laws because they are not legal specialists. Lawmaking needs to be carried out only by professionals, meaning trained lawyers.

In the Bulgarian model of collective legal consciousness, a good law is assumed to be one that is clear and applicable to every situation. Only a few Bulgarian participants expressed doubt about what a judge should do. The majority believed that judges should apply the law exactly as it is written; to proceed in any other way would distort “objectivity.” In addition, a “good law” should be stable, long lasting, and therefore almost a frozen construct. Two groups made references to the laws of England as examples of “good laws” that could survive centuries unchanged. “The law should be the work of a genius that does not change every month or year. The legislature should think very carefully before adopting a law.” [B 1].

However, with this high expectation of what law is supposed to be, there came also a deep frustration with how things are in practice. Because lawmakers lack professional competence in legal matters, the laws that they produce are believed to be useless and, therefore, need to be continually amended. Courts and judges routinely apply law in an arbitrary fashion rather than objectively, and ordinary people do not comply with the written laws and find ways to break them or bend them on a daily basis. The result is widespread cynicism among Bulgarians about how law works in practice. This state of affairs could be attributed either to the structural inefficiency of the institutions in Bulgaria or to the high level of corruption among the judiciary, which has been well recorded. Without disputing those points, I would argue that an examination of Bulgarian legal consciousness shows that there is also a contributing factor. It consists of what might be called the “normative gap” that has opened up between the idealized and unrealistic image of what law is supposed to be and the complexity and messiness of the real life.
In my judgment, a relatively formal statement of the difference between popular English and Bulgarian approaches to law can be regarded as a significant variable in defining types of collective legal consciousness. In the English case, law is seen as a negotiable balance between freedom and restriction; in the Bulgarian case, law is seen as a set of rigid rules. This distinction comes close to that identified by Conley and O’Barr in their vision of law in the popular mind as either relationship-oriented or rule-oriented.\(^{23}\)

The perception of the Polish people of what law is adds a new dimension to this distinction. It was close to the Bulgarian version in terms of interpreting law as a set of rules that are fixed in written legal codes, but it was not the same. Most of the Polish respondents did not speak about law with the same level of rigidity. Instead, they preferred to think of a law more as a “regulation” than as a strict order; that word was used more often in the Polish groups than in the two other countries. Typical of a Polish focus group was the view that: “The law is part of our life, it’s the everyday thing, it’s around us. Most things we want to do must be legally regulated. If we want to cross the street, the law tells us to cross on green, not on red.” [P1]. Or, “The law regulates everything in life. The law says what is less important, what is more important, what should be the reference point, what should be obeyed. The function is to tell us whether we are doing the right thing or not, as people.” [P7]. Law is important because it “regulates all relationships between people.” [P1]. By regulating everything, law could either be useful or it could be harmful and dangerous, depending whose interests it represented. [P7].

Like the Bulgarians, Polish people perceived law as a subject of highly specialized professional knowledge. For them, the implication was that any involvement of lay people in legal procedures was inappropriate by definition, and highly undesirable. A participant from Warsaw commented: “I really do not understand how such person [a non-professional] can have anything to do with justice. Sometimes there is an advertisement in the media: ‘Looking for people to serve as members of the jury, no experience required.’ I have seen it many times on the internet or in the newspapers. I do not know how such a person could be there and do the job”. [P1].

How could one apply these codified professional rules to the complexity of everyday life? Opinion among Poles was divided. Some of the arguments were similar to the mainstream Bulgarian view that the

\(^{23}\) Conley & O’Barr, supra note 17, at 9–11.
body of law should be written so well that it would allow for every possible situation. In that case, there would not be a need for a judge to exercise discretion.

However, among Polish participants the second view was equally strong. Circumstances should influence the implementation of law to make it fair. “The letter of the law should not be more important than a human being.” [P 6]. According to this view, the law should be enforced together with “moral judgment” [P 5]; it should not be “soulless” [P 7], and in applying law, a judge should do his or her best to understand the mental state of the person before them at the time the offence in question was committed.

In some ways, this discourse resembled the characteristic English devotion to common sense, but there were subtle differences. In the popular English account of what law should be, common sense was expected to be the very essence of law, whereas the Polish interpretation of law, being a rigid set of rules, is not capable to deliver justice. It should be “softened” by considerations of humanity, morality, and ordinary human kindness. This view was expressed by one of the participants this way: “The law and the emotions are like black and white. You might get completely destroyed by the law unless your state of mind and spirit are taken into account. What counts is some legal code, from this point to that point. A judge will not ask why you felt so strongly that you had to do it. That destroys people.” [P 2].

It seems that the vision of law that could be at best a crude tool to regulate life contributed to the development of what may be called a “risk management” approach. Many of our respondents noted that law puts individual human beings into a frame that is too strict and confining, and that experience can often cause depression and nervous breakdowns. [P 2]. As a participant from Zambrow expressed it: “In general, the law is there to tell us what we can do and what we cannot do, and we should move around in our daily life so as to keep well clear of it. It is important not to expose oneself to it.” [P 7].

Within this model of collective legal consciousness, the legal space is perceived as a social realm that should always be avoided. Any interaction with law is dangerous and will inevitably cause problems. As one participant put it: “And if we are supposed to use law in a nice way, not in a stressful way, that is impossible.” [P 5]. Therefore, it seems that there is an established instinct to keep away from all legal institutions, and everything connected to them, as far as can be managed. Statements such as “whenever I see a policeman walking towards me, I’d rather
sidestep” [P 2] were fully agreed upon by the rest of the group. However, when it is not possible to steer clear of the law, then it was accepted that the interaction would be more like a game of chance, in which “you need to have more luck than brain” [P 5] if you hope to be the winner.

The survey data from England, Bulgaria, Poland, and Norway supports the pattern that emerged from the focus group data. It shows that a significantly larger number of Bulgarians, Poles, and Norwegians think of law as a set of strict rules than English people do (See table 1). When asked about the first image that they associated with law, 41.1 percent of Bulgarians, 43.2 percent of Poles, and a significantly higher proportion of Norwegians (83.8 percent), referred to written codes; in the English survey, the number was only 29.3 percent. Bulgarians, more than people in any of the other three countries, associate law with order and discipline. In contrast, English people are much more likely to think of law as a social process in which people negotiate with law and its agents and institutions: 27.4 percent of them took that view against 8.9 percent in Bulgaria, 13.2 percent in Poland, and 2.3 percent in Norway.

Table 1 The perception of what law is.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What images come to your mind when you hear the word law? Do you think of?(in%)</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Norwegian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Written law, rules and regulation</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order and discipline</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People involved in law-making and implementing</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/DK/NA</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pattern repeated when people were asked about their view on the implementation of law and the discretion that judges use in making their decisions. For English people, law should provide a guideline: A framework within which a judge would be expected to examine the events in context and then exercise her discretion in making a decision. This view was supported by 67.8 percent of English
respondents, who believed that law should set out general principles, which then could be adjusted to the circumstances (see table 2) and 71.2 percent expected the judges to exercise their discretion when making those adjustments (see table 3).

This ratio was reversed in Bulgaria, where 63.4 percent perceived law enforcement as a procedure requiring only a straightforward application of the law to the facts of the event, and 47.2 percent expected the firm application of what is in the written code even if it happens to be unreasonable in the particular circumstances. Only a minority, 24.3 percent, were inclined to support a more nuanced and softer approach that would see law as a set of general principles. Even where the survey question itself alluded to a possible contradiction between justice and the letter of law, only 36.7 percent would want a judge to choose a fair solution at the expense of formal legal principles (see tables 2 and 3).

Table 2 Preferences for 'hard law' versus 'soft law'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which would be better: (in%)</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Norwegian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>to have very detailed laws so that Courts and Judges can apply the law to everyone in the same way</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to have laws that set out general principles and let Courts and Judges decide for themselves how best to apply them in the circumstances of particular cases</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/DK/NA</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 Preferences for strict versus discretionary implementation of law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Which comes closer to your view?</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Norwegian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would it be better for Courts and Judges (in %):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to apply the ‘letter of the law’ even if they feel the law is unreasonable in the circumstances</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to take account of what the law says, but decide for themselves what they think is fair and reasonable in the circumstances</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/DK/NA</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Polish data on this issue is closer to the Bulgarian pattern than the English one, though fewer Poles leaned towards the hard model of law than Bulgarians.

The Norwegian data on the issue of law application, on the other hand, came out closer to the English view, although with a stronger touch of formalism on both indicators. Preference to treat law as a set of flexible principles was expressed by 57.7 percent, slightly less than the English 68.7 percent (table 1). Also, 64.4 percent of Norwegians saw the need to allow a court the opportunity to act justly rather than in legalistic fashion, again close to the 71.2 percent of English responses to this question (table 2).

In an attempt to understand the data, the first thing that comes to mind is that these differences reflect the differential impacts on legal consciousness that the experience of a “common law” and “civil law” traditions have. Common law is concerned with pragmatism, its reliance upon developing the law through precedent, and its allocation of a central role in lawmaking to the judges. On the one hand, civil law is based on an elaborate set of written rules produced by a legislature and
implemented in court. What this finding demonstrates is how deeply legal traditions can penetrate into the collective legal consciousness of the people and determine their image of what law is and should be.

This invites a close look at the ongoing debates among socio-legal scholars on the use of concepts such as legal tradition, legal ideology, and legal culture, which tend to be expressed in a confrontational manner. Patrick Glen studied the development of law as an institution from a historical perspective and identified distinct streams of legal traditions, but he is critical of the more sociologically orientated concepts of ideology or culture. 24 Roger Cotterrell acknowledges the importance of analysing legal ideologies as a set of values and attitudes among the people to whom the law applies, but he does not find broader concepts particularly telling. 25 Lawrence Friedman has introduced the concept of legal culture as the expression of the characteristic way of thinking and acting in relation to law in the everyday life of ordinary people. Yet, he goes on to suggest that it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the “internal legal culture” of those who operate inside of the legal institution and the “external culture” of the ordinary people as daily users of law. 26

What is missing in this debate, and what the findings of this research suggest, is that the separate layers of social reality are closely intertwined. The relevant question should not be one of “either/or” but of “how much.” We can safely suggest that legal tradition, understood as legal principles and institutions that have been developed and applied through a significant run of history, is shaping the contemporary thinking of people belonging to that tradition. So, if we are to understand legal consciousness today, we need to examine how the perception of law is produced and consumed within that tradition and then draw out its social implications, such as what meaning people attach to law, what expectations they have, and how they behave towards it in everyday life.

However, our comparative data shows that the influence of the legal tradition on the formation of collective legal consciousness is only part of the story. A comparison of the Norwegian data with the Polish and Bulgarian data suggests that although the legal tradition of Norway is clearly significant, it is not the only factor responsible for constituting

the mass perception of what law is and how it should be implemented. It cannot explain why the dominant formalistic vision of law there has not resulted in a clear “hard law” model in Norway to the same extent as elsewhere. As tables 2 and 3 suggest, in terms of bringing the flexibility of common sense fairness and policy orientation into the process to implementation of law, Norwegians are closer to English thinking than to civil law countries such as Poland and Bulgaria. Also, there is a need to account for the differences between the Bulgarian and Polish relationships with law and to explore other variables that might bring a better understanding of the occasionally puzzling data on the collective legal consciousness in the countries under scrutiny.

IV. THE PERCEPTION OF THE SOURCE OF LAW AND FAITH IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The theme that crystallised throughout the focus group discussions as being significant for understanding collective legal consciousness related to the political culture in the country. Do people suppose that they can influence lawmaking processes? Do they feel that the lawmakers are accountable to them? Do people believe that they possess some level of control over the law imposed on them?

In this context, it is important to clarify the type of law and the sources of law that participants referred to during the discussions in each country. Are they the same laws or different laws that make the strongest contribution to the formation of the generalized image of law? In the popular image, is law always linked to the same source?

In all countries, there was a shared background that formed the dominant image of law. They include those “small laws” that affect everyday life, such as traffic regulations (speed limits, parking, ticketing, and intrusive policing) and measures to control antisocial behaviour. This foundation was then extended into more specific areas of law, and the differences became apparent in each country. In the English groups, the shared understanding of law was elaborated mainly in terms of examples drawn from criminal law and justice, while the Poles tended more often than either the English or the Bulgarians to refer to business, labor law, and law governing tax. Bulgarians, more than others, offered examples from welfare-related law, such as the regulation of childcare and maternity, wages and income support, health care, and pensions.27

27 More research needs to be done to put this observation into an appropriate social context, but even the raw evidence demonstrates how closely the meaning of law in the popular mind reflects established social expectations and the broader social processes that the society is experiencing.
Despite the differences, it was evident in all the countries under study that law is associated with the state. Politicians and government were seen as the source of law or, at least, as being fully responsible for the laws of the land. Although there were acknowledgements and passing comments, in the Polish groups more often than those from other countries, that there are other alternatives such as religious laws, natural laws, customs, traditions and the like, the notion of state law was clearly dominant. It is therefore not surprising that the relationship between law and the general public in any country was formed in the context of political order.

The issue here is whether people feel that they have the power to influence the laws that they are required to live by and whether they believe that there are levers available to them in their society to exercise control over the making of future laws if they should wish to do so. This could be summarized as a notion of ownership over the legal environment to which they belong.

The English discussants put forward a number of options about various ways in which they felt able, in principle, to respond to laws that they dislike or, at the very least, express their dissatisfaction. The immediate reaction of the participants was to approach either their local council or their Member of Parliament, “who would sort it out,” [E 3] “because they are the ones that speak for us, that is why we elect them, to do those things and then they go and speak for all of us.” [E 4]. If that does not work then “we have the right to vote: The right to vote a parliament out and bring a new government in.” [E 6]. Expressing frustration with the dominance of one party in Parliament at the time of the research, a participant from Bristol stated: “I think that the main problem we have got at the moment is not having an effective opposition. There is never any debate anymore in parliament and if the present government wants to do something they will go ahead and do it and that is what has been happening for the last ten years.” [E 5].

Mass protest was also considered an effective form of political action to apply pressure on the lawmakers and demand that unpopular laws be changed. Respondents suggested that people could “get petitions up, organize marches” [E 8] and “walk the streets, put banners up.” [E 5]. There were references in different groups to the mass demonstrations against the Poll Tax\textsuperscript{28} twenty years earlier, when “millions marched on

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\textsuperscript{28} The Poll Tax was a reform measure adopted by the Conservative Government in 1990 under Margaret Thatcher proposing local taxation charges by a flat rate per person rather than in proportion to the value of a property. The public generally took the opposite view. The protests
the Parliament in London and eventually the law got scrapped.” [E 4]. There was also faith in an online petitions website initiated by the government with statements like, “You can hit it, and it goes directly to the government.” [E 7].

Other mentioned channels of influence were organized civil society groups and the media, which can “influence the government and make them change any law that we do not like by humiliating them on telly. Get some celebrity to speak out and they suddenly go ‘Oh dear, we will get on to it.’” [E 1]. Every English group contained not one but several people who reported that, when they had felt strongly about a particular legal plan or enactment by the government, they had themselves used some of these methods to express their disapproval.

However, it would be misleading to derive an impression that there was no sense of powerlessness or even dissatisfaction among the English discussants. They realized that peaceable civic activity and public protest quite often failed to produce the outcomes they sought, and that caused a feeling of discontent. 29 Yet, the strongest reason for political frustration felt by the English discussants was the lack of commitment by their fellow citizens. Many people argued that others around them were not active enough and claimed that most people do not care about public affairs until an issue affects their own life immediately and directly. Even then, our focus group members’ usual stereotype was that “The British way is just to complain about things and do nothing.” [E 8]. As one discussant from London put it: “People have to be really pissed off and generally people do not bother. We get together in pubs and moan about things to each other but we do not go to our councillors and we do not follow the route that you should follow to be able to get things done.” [E 1].

In other words, the conclusion from the English discussions was that disillusionment with law was usually blamed either on those who are currently in government office or on the apathetic behaviour of the English population in general. But what was more significant is that the English participants as a whole had a faith in the political system. They

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29 The resentment was repeatedly illustrated in reference to the series of mass marches and petitions in London before and during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Many people felt ignored and disillusioned because of the disregard of their views. ‘Million’ march against Iraq war, BBC (Feb. 16, 2003, 04:10 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2765041.stm.

believed that they genuinely possess a degree of control over the regulation of their lives, and that they will be able to exercise that control if ever it becomes necessary.

In the Bulgarian and Polish groups, this notion of ultimate democratic accountability was absent. Instead, most people believed that although some forms of protest, like collecting signatures for petitions and demonstrating in the streets, are as freely available to them as to the citizens of other countries, ultimately the citizenry is unable to change anything. People feel so against the political system. Among all the Polish participants, only one person stated that he had contributed personally to a civil initiative, and in Bulgaria likewise just one focus group member said that she had once signed a petition about a proposed law.

Still, the Polish discussants voiced the opinion more strongly than the Bulgarians that in principle everyone should make use of their right to proclaim their disagreements. They understood that they should take action to change things. In a few cases, they said that they knew of real community activism in their country, albeit small-scale. Asked to describe a positive outcome of such activism, one respondent gave the example of a grass-roots group of moralistic vigilantes: “Some ladies got together in a town somewhere and effectively introduced a ban on pornography in shops. They just manipulated the shopkeepers or something.” [P 3].

In spite of such minor examples, there was little evidence overall of any sense of political empowerment among the focus group members. The general understanding was that social participation does not make much difference, and, besides, there is no social benefit in getting involved. “Everyone is busy earning their living, keeping their jobs” [P 5]. There was also a concern that participating in civil activity might earn one a reputation as a troublemaker, so that instead of getting a better law one simply attracts retaliation. As a participant put it: “[People] cannot do anything. What can they do? Some individuals will stick out and they will get a kick in the butt, or someone will take note of them and then they will be in an unenviable situation.” [P 1]. “We do not want to lose our jobs, lose everything just because we had a different view on life” [P 5].

Poles’ responses to unwelcome legislation could be well described by the same strategy of risk management mentioned above. They might draw on this informal repertoire when the law confronts them as confusing and difficult to comply with, and certainly when they
could see that it would be unfair or irrational. A respondent explained that “one does not need to go in for breaking the law. It is enough to stay on the edge, manoeuvre a little to have things our way, without harming anyone.” [P 8]. If the risk of punishment is high, then many participants thought that compliance rather than objection would be the only prudent course: “[E]ven if it is foolish, one has to obey it otherwise one can get punished. One does it to be on the safe side.” [P 7]. As a participant from Katowice admitted, “I am afraid of the consequences...... I simply cannot win against the state machine.” [P 3]. Yet, if the risk is not high, then unpopular law could be simply evaded. Remarks like “As Poles, we are the kind of nation who just evade it. We do that in a creative way, in an inventive way” [P 6] were typical in Polish groups.

In the Bulgarian focus groups, conversations about participation and protest resembled the Polish themes fairly closely. The participants certainly understood and accepted that laws might be less than perfect in their design and impact, and there were plenty of rhetorical suggestions about various forms of mass participation. But, they displayed little conviction that anything effective could be done. At the same time, the Bulgarians laid greater emphasis on the necessity, inevitability, and appropriateness of general obedience than the Poles. Their inclination towards resistance by civil means was correspondingly weaker.

The pronounced contrast that the research displayed between English and East European approaches to law, compliance, and means of resistance showed that quite different assumptions underpin the relationships between the respective populations and their legal processes. For English people, legal rules are something to be analyzed, criticized, clarified, interacted with, and if necessary, renegotiated. For many Poles and most of the Bulgarians, a particular law may or may not be perceived as necessary, or just, or appropriate in what it contains, but it is nevertheless seen as an instruction to the people by a rigid structure that cannot be argued with.

These observations are supported by the survey data (see table 4). Asked what to do if, in their view, a law is unjust, the dominant English response was to campaign to change it for the better. Seventy-four percent of English people believed that they should protest against a bad law. A more modest 57.8 percent of Poles agreed with them, but only 40.6 percent of Bulgarians did. Bulgarians, much more than people in any of the countries under scrutiny, were inclined to think that a law is a law and that it is not the business of the public to set about changing it. Instead, it should be obeyed (33.4 percent), or if they find that it is a
really bad law, then it would be justifiable to ignore it or evade it (12.2 percent).

Norwegian responses to this question about what to do with a bad law were closer to the English results, with a slight trend toward obedience rather than rebellion. This supports the argument that one of the factors that divide the legal consciousness of one country from another is rooted in the political culture of the countries concerned. One could perhaps suggest that while the British and Norwegians saw themselves as living in an established and reliable democracy, the Poles and Bulgarians do not share that privilege. In both countries, even the most recent experience is of lengthy post-communist insecurities and uncertainties brought about by political turmoil and the harsh requirements of economic transition. It is hardly surprising that ordinary citizens in Poland and Bulgaria are instinctively disinclined to place their trust in the political system and do not feel themselves personally to be a responsible part of it.

Table 4  Expected responses to a law that felt to be unfair.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suppose Parliament passed a law that some people felt was really unfair and unjust. What should these people do? (in %)</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Norwegian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obey the law</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore or evade the law</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer a tip or bribe to officials or the police, so that they do not enforce the law</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest against the law</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/DK/NA</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This argument gives some but not all of the reasons that might explain the differences. If a sense of ownership of the legal framework in the country results only from the presence or absence of trust in the political system, then one would expect more people in Bulgaria to say that they would “ignore a bad law or find a way around it” than to say that they would simply “obey it.” Also, if the level of distrust in the legal
institutions results only from the current political processes in the country, then one would expect to find a different pattern when the source of law is known to be the European Union rather than the national government. Even though the EU is outside the country, it enjoys significantly higher public respect in both Bulgaria and Poland than local political institutions.

Yet, the pattern was the same, as we can see in Table 5. When people were asked what their response would be if they disagree with legislation produced by international organizations such as the EU or the UN, English and Norwegians would expect there to be active engagement with the source of the law and negotiations with it (73.3 percent among English respondents and 78.8 percent among Norwegians). In contrast, Bulgarians, more readily than respondents in other countries, suggested obedience (33.4 per cent) and evasion (12.2 per cent).

Table 5 Expected responses to unpopular standards set by international organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If you do not like particular standards set by organizations like the EU or UN, should you: (in %)</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Bulgarian</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>Norwegian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reject them</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accept and apply them</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>just pretend to accept, but not really apply them</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>try by argument and negotiations to get these international organizations to change these particular international standards</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other/DK/NA</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This evidence leads me to conclude that in addition to the established “transition to democracy” factor that distinguishes Poland and Bulgaria on one side from Norway and England on the other, additional variables need to be examined. We should probe more deeply into the more subtle aspects of social relationships such as the culture of trust\(^{30}\) if we are to arrive at a convincing explanation for the distinctive attitudes of alienation and distancing from legal and political order established in the society. However, that inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Bringing the observations presented in this paper together, I would suggest that there is a strong ground for the view that societies construct a sense of social order that is specific to them. As a necessary part of that broad process, they develop a collective legal consciousness. That consciousness provides them with distinct interpretations of the meanings, the content, and the roles of law in the lives of the people; it also prescribes their mode of interaction with legal institutions. Collective legal consciousness at a societal level appears to be too complex of a phenomenon to be subjected to analytical modelling, but research does indicate some dimensions of it that can be identified.

As an expression of the meaning of law, one can differentiate societies by assessing the relative levels of the formalistic perception of law. At one end of that spectrum would be a society that approaches law as a means of negotiation and adjustment, closely resembling what Emile Durkheim would call an organic solidarity. At the other end would be a society that perceives law as a set of rigid rules imposed from above, which fits better to a Weberian view of state-society relations, or in some societies a radical Marxist vision of law and order.

As for the content, it is clear that in different societies, different areas of law play the major role in constructing an overall image of what law means for a particular society. The societal variation in the composition of the image appears to depend on various aspects of the condition of socio-economic and political affairs and their relation to law, including the nature of civil society, the character and level of business relationships, health and welfare patterns, and so forth. It seems that in any given society, each factor assumes an importance that is

\(^{30}\) On the culture of trust, see Bo Rothstein, *Social Traps and the Problem of Trust* 4 (2005).
locally determined so that a particular combination constitutes the core of the image of law in the popular mind. At the same time, the political context, for example whether a democracy is securely established or shakily transitional, shapes how people relate to legal institutions and how much control they feel they have over the legal environment within which they must function. Any specific combination of all those factors determines what role people attribute to law in any given society to secure and maintain the social order around them.

As a last point, I would argue that the prospect of gaining better insight into collective legal consciousness is fundamentally important to socio-legal scholarship. It would assist our understanding of legal culture and, with it, our comprehension of not only what law means for people in everyday life, but also how it works in a particular socio-cultural context.

Appendix: Focus Groups locations and timetable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Group Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Dates in 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Better educated</td>
<td>9 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Worse educated</td>
<td>9 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>10 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yate</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>10 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>From villages in SW England: Almonsbury Winterbourne Coalpit Old Sodbury</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>11 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sheffield</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>12 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>From villages in North England: EckingtonBen Rhydding Dronfield Dore Mosborough</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>12 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>14 January</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Bulgarian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Dates in 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sofia</td>
<td>Worse educated</td>
<td>5 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sofia</td>
<td>Better educated</td>
<td>6 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Opanets</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>16 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Topoly</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>14 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aksakovo</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>10 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pleven</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>15 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Pleven</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>15 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Varna</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>17 February</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Polish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Dates in 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>Worse educated</td>
<td>22 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Warsaw</td>
<td>Better educated</td>
<td>29 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Katowice</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>13 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turosn Koscielna</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>13 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mierzecice</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>13 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lubliniec</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>11 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Zambkow</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>12 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Biakystok</td>
<td>Cross section</td>
<td>11 March</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>